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Industrial Democracy 
Gordon McCaffrey 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept oj 
participation by workers in jobs and management and to 
corne to some conclusions as to the rôle oj industrial demo-
cracy, in Us various définitions, présent and future, in Cana-
dan Industrial Relations. 
Workers participation has become a magie word in many countries. Yet almost everyone who 
employs the term thinks of something différent. There are people who feel that workers 
participation is the panacea for solving most labor-management relations problems and that 
it wtll even become the underlying concept of the future Society. 
Some people use the term as a synonym for what they call industrial democracy. Still others 
use it as a battlecry for uprooting the présent System of ownership and management of the 
economy. Again, for others it is more a tool of applied psychology to be used to counteract 
the dehumanization of industrial work. Still others employ the term « participation » with regard 
to spécifie procédures, for instance the consultation machinery in an enterprise, negotiation 
over problems of displaced workers, or profit sharing. 
The difficulty is that the term « workers participation » is linked with such concepts as 
democracy, management rights, efficiency, human needs, and moral rights and has become so 
loaded with émotions and idéologies that a dispassionate discussion, free from preconceived 
opinions and pre-established attitudes, has become extremely difficidt. Industrial Relations 
(Berkeley) Vol. 9, No. 2, February 1970, p. 117. 
— Johannes Schregle, Chief, Labour Law and Labour Relations 
Branch, Social Institutions Development Department, Inter-
national Labour Office, Geneva. 
Considérable interest is being expressed in the subject of industrial 
democracy. The term is used to describe one of two broad catégories of 
activity: either participation by wor-
kers in determining the scope of 
their jobs and how they will be per-
formed, or participation in the ma-
nagement of the enterprise. 
McCAFFREY, G., Assistant Director, 
Législation Department, Government 
Employées' Department, Canadian 
Labour Congress, OTTAWA. 
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The idea itself is not new. The demand for worker participation in 
— or indeed for control of — industrial décisions has its roots in the 
earliest days of the Industrial Révolution. As workers became conscious 
of themselves as members of a class, they began to take concerted action 
against industrial conditions and the new capitalist power. Cotton mill 
workers and coal miners in England and weavers in Scotland engaged 
in the first large-scale strikes in 1808 to get relief from starvation wages 
and crippling working conditions. Intolérable conditions gave birth to the 
socialist movement of Robert Owen in the décade 1820-1830, to the 
Chartist Movement in the 1840s, to Co-operative Movement and the 
Friendly Societies, the writings of Karl Marx, socialism, syndicalism, guild 
socialism and the British Labour Party. In each stage of the workers' 
movement throughout the world there has been the demand for reform 
of the capitalist System of révolution to overthrow it and create a new 
society. 
The current interest in industrial democracy is part of the historical 
movement in which workers everywhere hâve struggled for an équitable 
share in production and for improved working conditions. It is being 
stimulated by the sweeping demands for the democratization of school, 
university, church and nearly every social institution. Participation, it is 
claimed, will reduce conflict between management and labour and breed 
industrial harmony. Management and workers will stop being antagonists 
and become partners sharing common goals. Everyone — workers, 
management and the public — it is argued, will benefit by the extension 
of democracy to the workplace. Participation will improve worker morale, 
develop human potential, inorease production, create industrial peace. 
The difficulty with both participation and industrial democracy lies 
with their meaning, which can vary from person to person. The danger 
is that they will be used to confuse and to manipulate rather than to 
explain or to elucidate. An activity can be proclaimed as a form of 
participation where in fact there is only servile obédience to authority. 
A relationship can be described as a form of industrial democracy where 
worker participation in vital décisions is illusory or non-existent. It is 
the purpose of this paper to examine the concept of participation by 
workers in jobs and management and to corne to some conclusions as 
to the rôle of mdustrial democracy, in its various définitions, présent 
and future, in Canadian industrial relations. In doing so, it will attempt 
to establish what are the impetus and the motivation behind the demand 
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for various forais of participation, whether particular arrangements for 
participation distribute real managerial power, or whether rankr-and-file 
workers are drawn into the exercise of power on a démocratie basis. 
THE DECISION-MAKING POWER 
Who makes the décisions in the plant, shop and office ? Who should 
make them ? Those who make décisions détermine who is hired, promoted, 
laid-off and fired ; the level of wages and the conditions of work ; how 
grievances are settled ; when and how machines replace workers ; what 
is made and what services are performed ; the price at which goods and 
services are offered for sale ; the distribution of profits ; and many other 
values. 
This decision-making, or industrial government, can be carried out 
in a variety of ways : 
- Authoritarianism — one man or a few people make the rules 
which workers must obey. 
- Paternalism — a form of authoritarianism, but based on a one 
big family concept in which « father knows best ». 
- Bureaucracy — working according to an elaborate set of rules 
and well-marked levels of authority. 
- Scientific management — industrial government by experts who 
prescribe « the best way of doing things ». 
- Participation — industrial décisions are made on the basis of 
varying degrees of participation by workers. 
THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF DECISION-MAKING 
Since World War II, the demand for worker participation in industrial 
décisions has intensified on both sides of the Iron Curtain. There are 
advocates for greater participation both within and outside the labour 
movement. Leading management consultants and officiais hâve recom-
mended various forms of consultative committee with a broad base of re-
présentation, and many such committees hâve been established. Whether 
the participation which is advocated involves sharing of authority, sharing 
of profits, consulting workers on a regular basis, or the overthrow of the 
capitalist system, it has been invariably described as industrial democracy. 
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Participation by workers in industriel decision-making can be achiev-
ed in four principal ways : 
- The ownership and control of the means of production are 
democratized. Workers take control of factories, shops and offices 
and run them by worker-elected committees on behalf of the total 
public. 
- Workers and management work together in one or another form 
of partnership. Workers may, by law or by voluntary arrangement, 
elect représentatives to the board of directors of their employer, 
share in the profits according to a prearranged formula, or acquire 
stock of the company under favourable conditions. 
- Management is democratized. This approach to industrial demo-
cracy emphasizes « the right man for the right job » and peak 
performance as the goals of both workers and management. Déci-
sions in such an enterprise may be made following consultation 
with a works council representing ail catégories of workers and 
supervisory personnel. 
- Decision-making is democratized through collective bargaining. 
Décisions affecting wages and conditions of work are reached by 
a process of negotiations between management and représentatives 
of workers. The results of bargaining are codified in a collective 
agreement. Controversial issues which arise during the life of the 
agreement may, or may not, be subject to negotiation in the period. 
WORKER CONTROL OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION 
Législation aimed at establishing worker control of factories has 
been in effect in Yugoslavia since the reconstruction period foUowing 
World War IL The Yugoslav Government introduced Workers' Councils 
as the major unit of management at the enterprise level. Pattemed on 
the People's Committees which had been set up to organize war production, 
they were part of a broad experiment to decentralize économie power 
and to establish a System of industrial self-government. 
Within the enterprise the Workers' Council is the highest authority. 
Members of the Council used to be elected by the trade union at the 
plant, but now are elected by the workers without référence to their 
union. The Council, together with the local People's Committee appoints 
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the company director. The director and his management board, consisting 
of three to 11 members, manage the firm under the direction and guidance 
of the Council, which meets monthly. The Council is responsible for the 
hiring and promotion of workers. It détermines wage levels and the use 
of profits, and approves plans for production and marketing. 
Décisions by the Council and the director are influenced by outside 
organizations. The League of Communists and the Communist Youth 
Organization participate in educational and propaganda activities to im-
prove worker skills and productivity. The Producers' Council of the 
local People's Committee gives advice to the Workers' Council. 
Although little is known about the Councils in the West, informed 
critics of the Yugoslav System insist that if the central political authorities 
find that a Council has not made wise judgments, the central authority 
will step in and place restrictions on wage increases and adjust price 
levels 1. According to a récent study of two Yugoslav companies, market 
forces exert a significant influence on methods of production, sales policy 
and profits. The government and the bank exert influence through taxation 
and the interest rate. After-tax profit is allocated by the Workers' Council 
to wage increases, investment and housing. If a company opérâtes at a 
loss, wages may be reduced. 
Rank-and-file participation in decision-making in Yugoslav workers' 
councils is difficult to assess. In theory, there is ample scope for local 
initiative and decision-making. But in practice, while rank-and-file mem-
bers, as well as experts including engineers, economists and other 
management personnel may express their opinions, it is the director who 
usually makes the décisions. Most members of Council are recruited from 
among foremen and technicians. Reports on production, technical, finan-
cial and marketing matters are prepared by specialists ; hence, it is difficult 
for rank-and-file members to add new information or to criticize décisions 
already made by management. 
Observers of Yugoslav industrial relations hâve concluded that 
Workers' Council législation has not given workers more authority 2. The 
1
 J. KOLA J A, Worker g Councils: The Yugoslav Expérience. 
2
 See F. E. EMERY and Einar THORSRUD, Form and Content in Industrial 
Democracy, pp. 31-42. 
See also Veljko Rus, « Influence Structure in Yugoslav Enterprise ». Industrial 
Relations, (Berkeley), University of California, Vol. 9, No. 2. Feb. 1970, pp. 
148-160. 
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Councils hâve primarily benefited management by giving it more freedom 
and scope for initiative. Local unions hâve become more dépendent, 
not only on management but on outside centres. Observers hâve also 
noted skilled and white collar workers and management personnel hâve 
consistently expressed a greater sensé of identification with the company 
and satisfaction with pay and working conditions than unskilled and semi-
skilled workers. With respect to participation, they hâve found that 
différences in skill, éducation and type of work are more décisive than 
formai arrangements for employée représentation. 
Under the Yugoslav System, therefore, the real decision-making 
power at the company level remains with management. The involvement 
and influence of workers in decision-making is not materially affected by 
mère membership on a Workers' Council. More important is the individuaPs 
insight, skill and job. 
Workers can achieve greater rights and influence on décisions either 
through strong représentation within management or through a union. 
If the workers' représentative body within the management group is 
strong, then the union will be weak, as in Yugoslavia. Yugoslav workers 
hâve an unusual opportunity to participate in the major issues confronting 
management, but while they hâve been active in dealing with personnel 
question, they hâve demonstrated only limited interest in décisions con-
cerning production, finance, sales and investment. Yugoslav workeis who 
hâve been asked to rank the major sources of job satisfaction hâve con-
sistently rated pay and working conditions at the top of the list, job 
interest and promotional opportunities in the middle, and job control and 
participation in self-management bodies at the bottom3. 
PARTNERSHIP OF WORKERS AND MANAGEMENT 
The sharing of the responsibility for the management of an enter-
prise has been developed in a number of countries, including West 
Germany, Norway, Israël, Swedeen and the United Kingdom, to mention 
only five with différent approaches. 
West Germany 
Sharing of responsibility in decision-making in West Germany dates 
back to as early as 1891, when workers' councils were introduced by 
3
 lbid., Josip OBRADOVIC, « Participation and Work Attitudes in Yugoslavia >, 
pp. 161-169. 
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legistation. In 1918, under the threat of political révolution, the govern-
ment extended worker représentation by means of collective bargaining 
and arbitration. In each case the changes were brought about to relieve 
political tension rather than to change worker-employer relationships. 
Historically, worker participation in the management of German industry 
has been the resuit of government, rather than union initiative. The labour 
movement, which is splintered between social démocratie, Communist and 
Catholic unions, had been comparatively weak at the plan level even 
during socialist political régimes. Hitler virtually destroyed the labour 
movement in the 1930s. 
At the end of the World War II, a prime objective of the Allied 
authorities was to denazify German society and break up the cartels which 
had financed and equipped the Nazi war effort. The unions were not 
strong enough to take part in this undertaking, and management could not 
be relied upon to do so. The British occupation authorities introduced 
co-determination as a political instrument. The move was fully supported 
by German trade union leaders who had spent some of the war period in 
Great Britain and Sweden, and who believed that formai political demo-
cracy was not enough to ensure industrial democracy in Germany. 
Catholic employers endorsed democratization at the company level. A 
Catholic spokesman declared that co-determination belonged to an order 
willed by God and must be accepted in the same way as the right of 
private property4. Co-determination was introduced by two major laws 
of 1951 and 1952. Additional laws were passed in 1955 and 1956. 
Co-determination opérâtes at two levels : the Supervisory Board 
and the Works Council. Worker représentatives also hâve equal voting 
power with management in the appointaient of the Labour Directe to 
boards of management. Participation through thèse agencies has been 
adopted most extensively in the coal and steel industries. 
In coal and steel, the Supervisory Board consists of five employée 
members, five employer members, and a neutral member appointed from 
outside the company. In some large companies the board may hâve 15 or 
21 members. Typical of employée représentation on the board, the Mue-
collar workers and the white-collar workers each nominate one repré-
sentative, and the remaining worker représentatives are nominated at the 
local union or central union level. The outside union nominees are usually 
4 ibid., Deutscher KATOLIKENTAG (1949), quoted by E. Potthoff, O. Blume 
and H. Duvernell, Zwischenbilanz der Mitzbestimmung, p. 26. 
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trade union officiais. The outside employer représentatives are usually 
lawyers, politicians, financers or businessmen. The neutral appointée is 
typically a civil servant or an académie. 
The Supervisory Board does not replace the authority of the share-
holders. Its job is to review ail business matters and supervise décisions 
made by the management board. It can call a meeting of shareholders, 
and can be authorized by the shareholders to exercise specified veto 
powers over management. But there has been relatively little interférence 
by supervisory boards in day-to-day management. 
The Labour Director provides an important avenue for worker 
influence on the board of management, but he cannot be considered to 
be a worker spokesman or delegate. He is appointed to boards in the coal 
and steel industries by majority vote of the worker and management 
représentatives on the supervisory boards. He is usually a former trade 
union officiai, but by necessity he is a person acceptable to both parties. 
The boards originally had three directors, ail equal in status — labour, 
technical and commercial. In récent years, many companies hâve brought 
in additional directors, ail appointed by the shareholders. The boaxd has 
the responsibility for managing the company, but the Labour Etirector 
is expected to initiate policies for wages and salaries and strictly personnel 
matters. In Canada such functions would be assigned to a Personnel 
Manager or Director of Industrial Relations. 
Employées of ail catégories, whether members of a union or 
otherwise, elect représentatives to the Works Council for a period of two 
years. Représentatives, who must be company employées, may be re-
elected and they need not be union members. There is little, if any, 
formai contact between the Council and the local union. The Council 
is in part a consultative body, but it also concerns itself with many of the 
issues normally associated with trade unions in Canada ; namely, pièce 
work rates and premium pay, hours of work, rest periods, vacation sche-
dules, training, welfare, and health and safety. The Council's main job 
is to advise the management board on how to achieve co-operation 
between labour and management and how to maintain discipline. In the 
event of a major disagreement with the management board, the Council 
can refer the issue to binding arbitration. 
The functions of the Works Council are supplemented by two other 
bodies. The Company Assembly, a superior body open to ail employées 
which meets at least four times a year, reviews the performance of the 
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Council. The Assembly can be called into emergency session. The 
Economies Committee consisting of représentatives of employées and 
management, reports économie information to employées. 
Any assessment of co-determination must be made within the German 
context. Co-determination was introduced during a period when there 
was a rapid improvement in the level of wages and in working conditions, 
and relative industrial peace. No doubt co-determination made an impor-
tant though indeterminate contribution in thèse areas, as did sustained 
économie prosperity. It bears repeating that while strong nationally the 
trade union movement in Germany at the local level is relatively weak, 
and works councils established by législation provided for instant worker 
représentation in management délibérations. While it is difficult to 
conceive of work councils of the German model working alongside unions 
without clashes of jurisdiction and interest, many German unions 
hâve succeeded in establishing a strong position in companies where 
co-determination is in opération. However, the increasing strength of 
unions has taken place, as with co-determination, during a period of high 
employment and pressure for democratization. Works councils hâve 
estabhshed themselves as effective agencies representing ail catégories of 
workers in functions normally associatd with unions. It is too early to 
détermine to what extent trade unionism and works councils (and other 
forms of co-determination) will co-exist harmoniously in situations 
involving political and économie tension. 
Meanwhile, observers hâve noted that neither labour nor management 
is satisfied with the institutional arrangements for industrial democracy. 
Labour spokesmen hâve critieized their works councils for not going 
far enough in giving employées an opportunity to be informed and 
to influence the decision-making process. Rank-and-file workers remain 
relatively indiffèrent. They view works councils and supervisory boards 
mainly as instruments for achieving higher status or advancement for the 
few workers who are elected or appointed to them. Management has 
critieized the councils for not aiding sufficiently in improving the operating 
efficiency of the enterprise. Management has continued to question the 
right, interest and capabilities of the labour représentatives on the councils 
and boards5. 
5 Richard B. PETERSON, « The Swedish Expérience with Industrial Democracy », 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 6, No. 2, July 1968, pp. 185-203. 
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Norway 
In Norway, worker représentatives were placed on the boards of 
some state-owned companies in the early 1950s. It was expected that 
this innovation would make three contributions to labour relations. First, 
it would serve as a control mechanism on the way management performed 
its personnel functions. Second, it would cause management to tread 
cautiously with respect to matters that were unpopular with workers. 
Third, it would increase the chances of managements making décisions 
that would take worker interests into account. 
In most respects, Norwegian experiments with worker participation 
on boards of management hâve been disappointing 6. Independent obser-
vers hâve pointed out that there is little évidence of communication 
between worker représentatives and their rank-and-file constituents ; 
that worker représentatives, faced with the choice between supporting the 
usual management goals and fighting for worker interests, hâve usually 
found it most expédient to take sides with the other board members ; and 
that the majority of workers hâve seldom, if ever, become involved in 
management matters. 
Israël 
In Israël, attempts to institutionalize worker participation in enter-
prises controlled by Histadrut (the General Fédération of Labour) hâve 
been discouraging7. Histadrut is both trade union centre and major 
industrial entrepreneur. In pursuing its many goals of developing a working 
class, helping to build a nation and establishing a just society, it has 
grown into a mass organization with 700,000 dues-paying members. 
It owns and opérâtes enterprises which account for about one-quarter of 
national employment and output. 
It is recognized, both inside and outside Histadrut, that plant-level 
labour relations are no différent than those which exist in the private and 
public sectors of industry in Israël. It was expected that Histadrut's 
enterprises would produce employer-employées relations of an exemplary 
6
 Einar THORSRUD and Fred E. EMERY, « Industrial Democracy in Norway », 
Industrial Relations, (Berkeley), University of California, Vol 9, No. 2, Feb. 1970, 
pp. 187-196. 
7
 Ibid., Eliezer ROSENSTEIN, « Histadrut's Search for a Participation Program >, 
pp. 170-186. 
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standard, but there is no more harmony, and in some cases much less, 
than exists between managers and workers elsewhere in Israël. 
A typical failure of the Histadrut experiments with industrial 
democracy is the Joint Production Committee. The original goals of the 
committees were to establish a formai framework for worker participation 
in management, and to increase productivity. Generally, the committees 
hâve failed to solve the problems of low productivity and poor work 
discipline, and hâve shifted their emphasis from worker involvement in 
decision-making to increases in productivity through piece-work. 
Participation experiments hâve broken down in Israël as a resuit 
of the basic conflict between management and worker self-interests. 
When the Joint Production Committee program collapsed, by the early 
1960s, Histadrut moved to a higher form of participation — worker 
représentation in management at the plant level and in the management 
of central organizations which control a number of enterprises. This 
experiment has fared no better than the others. Managers of Histadrut 
enterprises regard participation as a threat to their authority. Workers 
regard participation as a threat to their authority. Workers regard parti-
cipation as a marginal issue and continue to insist on material improve-
ments. 
Sweden 
In any discussion of industrial democracy, Sweden deserves spécial 
mention. Sweden is a highly industrialized country with a long tradition 
of sophisticated management and union organization as well as démo-
cratie government. The Swedes hâve avoided, or overcome, many of the 
négative aspects of labour-management relations that prevail in other 
market économies. Furthermore, Sweden has experienced the opération 
of works councils in several thousand enterprises for upwards of 12 years. 
The idea of works councils was first presented in Sweden in 1920 
in a pamphlet, Industrial Democracy, by Ernest Wigforss. A government 
committee was appointed to investigate the feasibility of using councils 
in industry, but a bill submitted to the Swedish Parliament in 1923 was 
defeated in the face of fierce opposition from the employers' confédération 
(S.A.F.). Twenty-three years later a Works Council Agreement between 
the S.A.F. and the trade union confédération (L.O.) was adopted. It 
provided for the organization of works councils in plants with a minimum 
of 25 workers (in 1958 increased to 50) for the sole purpose of mutual 
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discussion of production problems and exchange of information. The 
councils were given no negotiating or decision-making power. Within a 
year of the Agreement some 4,000 councils, including 3,700 representing 
L.O.-unions, had been set up. 
Observers of the Swedish experiments in industrial democracy 
councils hâve concluded that the councils hâve been useful in dealing with 
the suggestion System for improving production and in-plant safety and 
hâve been a useful sounding board for management policies. But council 
members hâve shown relatively little interest in making suggestions on 
company économie policies8. 
Both unions and employers hâve critieized the achievements of the 
works councils. The Works Council Agreement required that councils 
meet a minimum of four times a year, but unions hâve complained that 
many councils fail to meet that often. The unions maintain that informa-
tion supplied to council members by management is too scarce or too 
complex. Employers, on the other hand, hâve found that some worker 
représentatives hâve failed to show interest in the work of the councils, 
and hâve failed to disseminate information to ail employées, as required, 
at annual meetings. 
Quite apart from worker and management views, independent 
observers hâve found that works councils hâve had little, if any, influence 
in the area of management rights. After more than 12 years in opération, 
the councils hâve confined themselves almost entirely to consultation 
fonctions 9. 
United Kingdom 
In Britain, participation by workers has been confined to joint 
consultation committees. This has been the case despite the élection of 
Labour governments which hâve nationalized key industries and might 
conceivably hâve democratized management on a radical scale. In 
nationalized industries, trade unionists hâve been appointed to boards 
but hâve been considered as ordinary members and not as worker 
représentatives. Joint consultative committees in both nationalized and 
8 T. L. JOHNSTON, Collective Bargaining in Sweden, Harvard Université Press, 
1962. 
9 JOHNSTON, op. cit., p. 227. 
Richard B. PETERSON, «The Swedish Expérience with Industrial Democracy», 
Briîish Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 6, No. 2, July, 1968. 
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private industries are conceraed with routine health and safety questions 
and matters of production efficiency. Trade unions hâve maintained their 
traditional independent rôle of representing workers in collective bar-
gaining. 
The labour movement has traditionally been wary of participation 
of workers on management boards. A report by the Trades Union Con-
gress in 1944 concluded that the governing boards of nationalized 
industries must hâve an overriding responsibility to the public (as 
represented by Parliament) and could not be held accountable for their 
décisions to any outside interests (including those of the employées). 
More recently the TUC has made proposais (to the Donovan Commission) 
for increased participation 10. First, it wanted inclusion of a shop steward 
in « the normal body which regulariy meets at plant level to take 
décisions on the running of the plant ». Second, it suggested représenta-
tion at intermediate levels, for example, « at a level which represents the 
functional authority for the particular product in the enterprise ». Thirdly, 
it proposed that législation should permit companies to make provision 
for trade union représentation on boards of directors ». 
Lord Donovan commented on thèse proposais : « As regards the 
suggestion for workers' représentatives to be included in managerial 
bodies in the factory and at other levels of management apart from the 
board, we believe that our proposais for the reform of collective bargaining 
on the basis of comprehensive agreements at factory and company level 
will do more than could any other change to allow workers and their 
représentatives to exercise a positive influence in the running of the under-
takings in which they work ». He went on to say that managers and shop 
stewards must keep in close touch, but each party must be free to meet on 
their own and make décisions. 
Lord Donovan and a majority of the members of the Commission 
rejected the concept of workers' directors. First, they felt the worker 
représentative would be placed in an intolérable position when the board 
was making a décision which was deemed to be in the interest of the 
company as a whole but against the interest of the employées. Second, it 
would be next to impossible to détermine the degree of personal respon-
sibility which the worker représentative should bear for board décisions. 
10
 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, 1956-
1968, p. 257. 
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And third, a move to worker représentation would divert attention from 
the need to reconstruct macbinery for collective bargaining. 
DEMOCRATIZATION OF MANAGEMENT 
Management also has its proponents of participation. Beginning 
with the Hawthorne experiments in human relations in the workplaoe in 
the 1920s, this approach stresses the value of co-operation and partnership 
based on the harmony of goals between employées, or superiors and 
subordinates n . The idea has evolved through the work of Prof essor A.H. 
Maslow, an American social psychologist who formulated a widely-quoted 
hierarchy of human needs, Douglas McGregor, a professor of industrial 
management renowned for his Theory X and Theory Y, and more récent 
exponents of the « managerial grid », « job enlargement » and « T-
groups » and the fostering of a spirit of openness and mutual trust in 
employer-employée relations. The end resuit is a movement for particip-
ative management, where management is regarded mainly as a problem-
solving exercise and the aim of managers is to enable the individual or 
the group to grow with the job. Participation occurs in daily face-to-face 
relationships between ail levels of managers, supervisors and workers in 
an « open-system » organization. 
According to a highly-regarded version of this approach to industrial 
democracy, the most productive workers are happy workers, and the 
best way to keep people happy is to scrap ail practices based on Theory X 
and introduce practices inspired by Theory Y 12. Theory X is the con-
ventional approach to management, which, as articulated by McGregor, is 
based on the idea that workers are inherently lazy and will shun ail work 
if they can, that people must be directed, controlled and motivated by 
fear and punishment, and that the average person prefers to avoid res-
ponsibility, has relatively M e ambition and wants security above ail. 
Thèse négative assumptions about human nature are replaced by 
positive notions in McGregor's Theory Y. McGregor concluded that the 
n The Hawthorne experiments in work performance related to levels of plant 
illumination were conducted at the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric 
Company in the 1920s and 1930s. They form the basis of the human relations 
approach to labour relations. 
See Elton MAYO, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization. New York 
City, Viking, 1960. 
12
 Douglas MCGREGOR, The Human Side of Enterprise. 
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expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play 
or rest ; that threat of punishment and external control are not the only 
ways to induce people to work for organizational goals ; that the average 
person learns not only to accept, but to seek responsibility ; that the 
capacity for créative work is widely, not narrowly, distributed in the 
population ; and that in modem industry the intellectuel potential of the 
average person is only partially utilized. 
Much of McGregor's work is based on the concepts of Maslow, 
who pictured man as a créature of ever-expanding wants. As he satisfies 
his physiological needs for food, water, shelter and other biological 
demands, his safety needs for freedom from fear and danger, and his 
social needs for group aetivity and affection, man then aspires to fulfill 
his ego needs for réputation, self-respect and self-esteem, and finally 
his self-actualization needs for the libération of his créative talents. Since 
we live in an economy which fulfills the basic needs of most people most 
of the time, more and more people are demanding the intangible rewards 
offered by fulfillment of the higher levels of needs. Theory Y aims at 
integrating individual goals with those of the organization by making 
the job the principal means through which each employée can enlarge his 
compétence and sensé of accomplishment. When the goals of the individual 
and those of the enterprise coïncide, the enterprise is propelled by the 
motivation of ail its employées. Other management conceptions of 
participation are similar ; they play down fundamental conflicts and power 
relationships and emphasize the building of motivation at ail levels of 
the organization13. 
DEMOCRATIZATION THROUGH COLLECTIVE BARGANING 
Collective bargaining recognizes the historical demand of workers 
for equal authority with management in determining wages and condi-
tions of work. It also recognizes the mutuality of interest between 
workers and management. Both parties hâve a stake in the survival of the 
enterprise, and both parties want it to flourish. But unlike the human 
relations approach based on a harmony of interests and goals, collective 
bargaining emphasizes the fundamental conflict between workers and 
owners over the distribution of the wealth produced in their joint effort. 
Collective bargaining accepts the power struggle as being both legitimate 
13 Robert R. BLAKE, Jane S. MOUTON, The Managereal Grid. 
Frederick HERZBERG, Work and the Nature of Man. 
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and créative, and it provides a structure and a set of procédures for 
resolving différences. 
Unlike the human relations approach to participative management, 
collective bargaining gives workers a veto power in determining the raies 
that govern relationships with the employer. Unlike Marxist and socialist 
approaches to industrial democracy, collective bargaining does not seek 
to displace professional management with worker-controlled committees. 
It recognizes management as a specialist function. 
With collective bargaining, industrial harmony is always a conditional 
goal. The degree of harmony will dépend on the attitude of the parties 
toward the degree of equitability in the current wage-effort bargain, the 
actual work conditions, the level of profitability and comparable condi-
tions in the industrial community. True bargaining exists only when the 
union has the right to strike, and is willing to use it, and when manage-
ment is capable of taking, and willing to take, a strike or to impose a 
lock-out in a dispute over the terms of a collective agreement. Far from 
being a process which opérâtes under the law of the jungle as is frequently 
alleged, collective bargaining is based on the rule of law and the twin 
démocratie concepts of freedom of association and freedom of expression. 
The value of the démocratie process in bargaining dépends on the viability 
and effectiveness of the two parties. While a kind of guérilla warfare and 
some open conflict prevails from time to time, the vast majority of 
collective relationships proceed from day to day, and year to year, in 
an orderly and peaceful way. 
Conflict, which is the dynamic force in collective bargaining, is 
based on two opposed sets of wants, aspirations and discontents — those 
of the union and those of management. Workers want to strengthen their 
union as an on-going organization, they want higher incomes and improved 
working conditions, they want more control over their jobs, and they want 
to pursue broad social and économie goals. For management, collective 
bargaining is not the central issue. More important are production., invest-
ment, planning and marketing. If possible, most managements would 
exclude unions with outside affiliations as an unwarranted and unnecessary 
interférence in the control and direction of the enterprise. But where 
a union is recognized, management feels compelled to develop stratégies 
for containing its demands and influence. Management also wants to 
strengthen and protect its organization by keeping costs down and profits 
buoyant ; to retain control over vital décisions affecting the business ; 
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to achieve an accommodation with « a responsible union > ; and to pré-
serve the enterprise system. 
Collective bargaining exists in a variety of industrial relations 
Systems — ranging from those where there is a high degree of authority 
vested in central management and labour organizations to those which 
are founded on plant-level unions. Whereas bargaining is restricted to 
personnel matters in some jurisdictions, in others unions take the view 
that anything which affects working conditions is a matter for negotiation. 
As a system of industrial democracy, collective bargaining gives workers 
an opportunity to participate in social change. Each new collective 
agreement, which represents an accommodation between what manage-
ment wants and what the union wants, establishes a new basis of order 
and a new set of raies to govern behaviour in the workplace. The retent to 
which a union contributes to industrial democracy dépends on the degree 
to which its members participate in formulating and carrying out its 
policies and the effectiveness with which the union negotiates and adminis-
ters agreements. 
Milton Derber, a noted American industrial relations specialist 
concluded his comprehensive study of industrial democracy : 
« One of the principal lessons to be learned from the history of 
the collective-bargaining model of industrial democracy is the strength 
that it dérives from its flexibility and adaptability. Because it is an 
idea developed out of pragmatic expérience, it has the capacity for 
change as conditions change. Unlike more rigid idéologies which are 
the product of a single man's thought, it permits, indeed encourages, 
expérimentation. Some prîictitioners hâve tended to mythologize 'free 
collective bargaining' but even thèse hâve been more rigid in their 
rhetoric than in their behavior. Thus we can expect in the years ahead 
that the model will be no more fixed than it has been in the past, 
that new methods and procédures will be tried and new raies formu-
l a t e d i K 
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN CANADA 
Following are some of the conclusions which can be made on the 
subject of industrial democracy as it relates to Canadian labour-manage-
ment relations : 
1. Industrial democracy, viewed as participation by workers in 
the management of an enterprise, must be examined in the Canadian 
14
 The American Idea of Industrial Democracy, pp. 534-5. 
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context. While experiments in various concepts of industrial democracy 
may or may not, hâve been successful in other countries, it would be 
difficult if not impossible to transplant them to Canada. 
Industrial relationships in Canada are determined by two major 
forces — the System of compétition which prevails in a market economy 
and the body of law which has been adopted for the régulation of 
labour-management conflict and for the provision of certain minimum 
standards of employment. Both the market system and the légal system 
hâve provided the framework for collective bargaining, which in turn 
détermines the level of wages and the nature of working conditions in 
the major industries and in some levels of government. 
According to social and political indicators, Canadians hâve consist-
ently supported a modified market system, consisting of predominantly 
capitalist-owned enterprises and a relatively small proportion of publicly-
owned enterprises. The vast majority of Canadians also support varying 
degrees of économie and social change by constitutional processes rather 
than by violent révolution. Canadian workers, with some exceptions, 
rejeet violent révolution as an agency of social and économie change. 
Through their union organizations they hâve consistently pressed for a 
broad program of social and économie improvement for the common 
people through the démocratie process. Thus any modification in the 
quantity and the quality of participation by workers in management will 
resuit from (a) législative action, (b) pressure exerted by unions through 
the collective bargaining process, (c) co-operation between représentative 
committees of workers and management, or (d) voluntary action on the 
part of management. 
2. The concepts of industrial democracy and industrial government 
are derived from political democracy and political government. Whereas 
participation is the essence of political democracy, it would be quite 
simple, but erroneous, to exaggerate the degree of participation that is 
necessary or even possible in industry. Political democracy is based on 
the rule of law, majority rule, respect for minority opinion — and the 
important concept of « one man, one vote >. Despite the attractiveness 
of the notion that democracy in political government is of limited value 
without the complément of democracy in industrial government, it is 
impossible to transfer the concept of « one man, one vote > to industry 
without at the same time destroying the basis of private ownership. 
Investors would be reluctant, if not foolhardy, to risk their capital in an 
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 325 
enterprise in which workers had the right to participate in decision-
making on an equal basis. On the other hand, workers cannot exercise 
any significant degree of authority in decision-making on the basis of 
« one man, one vote », since by and large they cannot control enough 
shares in the majority of capitalist enterprises. Even in worker-owned 
enterprises, however, it would be necessary (as it has been necessary in 
other jurisdictions enjoying people's democracy in one form or another) 
to appoint managers who would be compelled to adopt the same attitudes 
and exhibit the same behaviour patterns with respect to workers as exist 
in capitalist enterprises. This would be the case whether the managers 
were hired from outside labour's ranks and directed by workers, or 
whether the management consisted of workers elected by, and responsible 
to, workers. 
3. Collective bargaining offers Canadian workers the most favour-
able opportunities of ail the available options for the extension of 
participation in decision-making. Unless there is unemploymemt and 
économie breakdown of eatastrophie proportions, Canadians will continue 
to reject révolution as the means to establishing greater worker partici-
pation. In a limited number of situations, Canadian workers hâve 
entered into arrangements with management, including labour-manage-
ment consultative committees which for the most part deal with matters 
of a marginal or non-controversial nature, and various kinds of profit-
sharing and stockholding. In some cases, thèse experiments in consultation 
and co-operation exist in organized plants and offices, in others they hâve 
been used to forestaU the organization of workers. Co-determination 
(workers représentation on boards of management) is an appealing 
concept, but one which offers little, if any decision-making power and 
only minor opportunities for actual participation to rank-and file workers. 
There is the additional difficulty that parallel forms of worker représen-
tation inevitably lead to conflict and nullification of effort. Participation 
through the democratization of management has made some inroads in 
Canada, particularly among those employers who are willing and able to 
pay higher wages and better fringe benefits than prevail in industry 
generally. But there is no identifiable increase in worker participation in 
decision-making in thèse firms, except on the level of consultation. This 
approach to co-operation invariably aims to eliminate unions or undermine 
their authority, and is suspect as a conscious effort to manipulate workers 
for increased production. 
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4. There is no grass-roots demand among workers for participation 
in management boards. There is, on the other hand, a strengthening of 
the traditional union demand for élimination of managements so-called 
residual rights and for the right to negotiate on any matter which affects 
workers' income, conditions of work and the quality of life. 
The demand for worker participation in management boards, or 
in similar forms of decision-making machinery, cornes from three main 
sources : First, those who substitute catch-phrases such as « ail power 
to the people » for any systematic examination of the way workers can 
effect improvements on the job ; secondly, those who envisage their 
vaguely-stated notion of « industrial democracy » as one of the instruments 
which will establish a new political, économie and social order ; and 
thirdly, those who deliberately seek to establish a rival system of worker 
représentation in order to drive a wedge between workers and their unions. 
5. Rather than striving for membership on a management board 
or committee, workers are demonstrably more concerned with getting 
higher income, improved worldng conditions and more responsibility 
in doing their own jobs. Participation with management in decision-making 
inevitably conflicts with thèse goals. Workers who are elected to represent 
workers are expected to fight for workers' interests ; but those same 
workers as members of a board of management would be expected also 
to support management or company goals. If there is a union in the 
enterprise, the worker représentatives on the board of management would 
frequently find themselves in conflict with union officiais who took 
issue with management policies, actions and décisions. 
6. Increased worker participation lies in the direction of negotiating 
an area of decision-making related to each job which the individual 
worker can call his own ; expanding job content so that each worker 
can become involved in planning as well as exécution and inspection, 
and relate what he does to the finished product and to society ; and 
providing opportunities for growing with the job and for training at 
company expense for higher levels of performance or responsibility. 
7. While some advocates of industrial democracy seek to integrate 
the interests of workers with those of management on the theory that 
this course of action would lead to complète worker ownership and 
control of industry, this approach ignores the fondamental différences 
in interests and goals of workers and management. It is more realistic 
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to seek greater participation for workers in decision-making through the 
process of collective bargaining. The latter course of action assumes that 
workers will continue to extend the scope of bargaining to any and ail 
matters affecting income and conditions of work. 
8. Since collective bargaining has proven to be the only effective 
means for achieving for workers a greater share of économie gains and 
improved working conditions, it is inévitable that collective bargaining 
will continue to be subjected to concerted attacks by those éléments in 
the community which want to monopolize the decision-making power. 
Regardless of the political or économie system, workers must organize 
and maintain strong unions. The labour movement must increase its 
efforts in organizing the unorganized, maintaining a united front on ail 
vital issues involving income and conditions of work, and pressing for 
économie and social change on a broad front for the benefit of ail 
Canadians. 
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La démocratie industrielle 
On a accordé beaucoup d'intérêt à la notion de démocratie industrielle d'un 
côté comme de l'autre du Rideau de fer. L'idée en soi n'est pas nouvelle. Dès les 
premiers temps de la révolution industrielle, les travailleurs et les mouvements 
syndicaux ont réclamé la participation aux décisions de l'entreprise. 
Une des difficultés majeures concernant la démocratie industrielle, ou la 
participation des travailleurs à la gestion, c'est que le sens qu'on lui donne peut 
varier du tout au tout d'une personne à l'autre. On peut se vanter qu'une action 
est une forme de participation à la gestion alors que, en réalité, il ne s'agit que 
d'une obéissance servile à l'autorité. Johannes Schregle, chef de la section du droit 
du travail et des relations professionnelles au service du développement des institu-
tions sociales de l'OIT a fait remarquer que l'expression participation des travail-
leurs à la gestion « est liée à des concepts de démocratie, de droits de la direction, 
d'efficience, de besoins humains et de droits moraux si chargés d'émolivité et 
d'idéologie qu'une discussion impartiale, libre d'opinions et d'attitudes préconçues, 
en est extrêmement difficile ». Le présent article a pour objet de considérer le 
rôle de la démocratie industrielle dans le contexte canadien des relations du travail 
et d'analyser les expériences tentées en d'autres pays, face à la revendication de 
diverses formes de participation à la gestion, en se demandant si les ententes 
particulières s'y rapportant, accordent un véritable pouvoir de décision et si les 
travailleurs du rang sont intégrés au processus selon une formule véritablement 
démocratique. 
On peut mettre à exécution un système de participation à la gestion de bien 
des manières. Premièrement, une personne ou quelques personnes, agissant d'auto-
rité, élaborent des règlements auxquels les travailleurs doivent obéir. Deuxièmement, 
on trouve le paternalisme, forme d'autoritarisme fondé sur la notion de famille 
étendue en vertu de laquelle « le père a toujours raison ». Troisièmement, il y a 
le processus bureaucratique où le pouvoir décisoire est diffus à travers divers 
échelons d'autorité et d'un ensemble complexe de règlements. Quatrièmement, on 
rencontre le système de la « gestion scientifique » où des spécialistes imposent « la 
meilleure manière de faire les choses». Enfin, les décisions peuvent découler d'une 
participation fondée sur divers degrés d'engagement des travailleurs. Dans la plupart 
des sociétés canadiennes, tout comme dans la plus grande partie du secteur public, 
l'autorité dans l'entreprise s'exerce selon les quatre premières formules. Ce n'est 
que là où les syndicats sont pleinement reconnus par la direction et où celle-ci 
s'efforce d'en empêcher l'implantation que la participation à la gestion revêt une 
signification spéciale. 
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Les travailleurs peuvent participer au pouvoir décisoire de bien des manières. 
On peut démocratiser la propriété et le contrôle des moyens de production. Dans ce 
cas, à l'extrême, les travailleurs s'emparent des moyens de production qu'ils gèrent 
au nom de la collectivité. D'autre part, les travailleurs et la direction peuvent s'en-
tendre sur une forme quelconque d'association qui peut inclure la participation 
aux bénéfices et l'achat d'actions de l'entreprise. On peut aussi démocratiser la 
direction en ce sens que l'entreprise s'efforce de placer « le bon homme à la bonne 
place » ou de prendre les décisions après consultation d'un conseil ouvrier qui 
représente toutes les catégories de travailleurs et de cadres. On peut enfin démocra-
tiser le pouvoir décisoire par le régime de la négociation collective. 
Les conseils ouvriers établis par le gouvernement yougoslave après la deuxième 
guerre mondiale fournissent un modèle moderne de démocratie industrielle par 
la propriété et le contrôle des moyens de production par les travailleurs. Ces 
conseils sont la principale unité de direction au niveau de l'entreprise. Les travail-
leurs de l'usine élisent directement les membres du conseil. C'est le conseil, en 
collaboration avec le comité des citoyens qui représente l'autorité politique nationale, 
qui désigne l'administrateur. Le directeur et son conseil d'administration, qui 
compte de trois à onze membres, gère la firme au jour le jour sous la direction 
du conseil qui se réunit mensuellement. C'est le conseil qui décide en matière 
d'embauchages, de promotions, de licenciements, de fixation des taux de salaires, 
de partage des bénéfices et qui approuve les programmes de production et de mise 
en marché. 
Les observateurs bien informés du système yougoslave font remarquer que, 
si l'autorité politique considère qu'un conseil prend des décisions qui ne sont pas 
sages, elle n'hésitera pas à intervenir et à procéder à ses propres ajustements en 
matière de salaires et de prix. Les profits qui restent après déduction des impôts 
sont alloués aux salaires, aux investissements et aux logements ouvriers. Cependant, 
si une société fonctionne à perte, il se peut que les taux de salaires soient abaissés. 
On a tendance à choisir les membres du conseil parmi les techniciens et les 
spécialistes plutôt que parmi les travailleurs du rang. Les représentants ouvriers 
au sein des conseils s'intéressent moins aux questions de production et de finan-
cement, de vente et d'investissement qu'à la paie et aux conditions de travail. 
Les conseils ouvriers dont la formation a été préconisée par les employeurs 
et les syndicats suédois dès le début de la décennie 1920 se sont vu déléguer ou 
ont assumé un pouvoir décisoire plus limité. En 1946, la SAF (Confédération des 
employeurs suédois) et la LO (Confédération générale du Travail) ont conclu sur 
les conseils ouvriers un accord qui prévoyait l'établissement de conseils dans les 
usines comptant un minimum de vingt-cinq travailleurs (en 1958, ce minimum fut 
porté à cinquante travailleurs) à la seule fin de discuter ensemble les questions rela-
tives à la productivité et d'échanger des informations. On n'a pas étendu aux conseils 
ouvriers le pouvoir de négociation non plus que celui de prendre des décisions. 
En Suède, syndicats et employeurs ont critiqué les réalisations de ces conseils. 
Les syndicats se sont plaints que les conseils avaient failli à l'obligation qui leur 
était faite de tenir les quatre réunions annuelles prévues à l'accord et que l'infor-
mation donnée par les employeurs aux travailleurs était à la fois maigre et ember-
lificotée. De leur côté, les employeurs ont reproché à certains représentants 
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ouvriers de négliger de transmettre l'information à tous les employés. La plupart 
des conseils ont confiné leur activité à l'exercice d'un rôle de consultation. La 
plupart des pays d'Occident qui ont tenté l'expérience de la participation à la gestion 
se sont inspirés du modèle suédois. 
Un troisième modèle, qui tient le milieu entre les systèmes yougoslave et 
suédois, c'est la cogestion établie par voie législative en Allemagne de l'Ouest après 
la deuxième guerre mondiale. Les travailleurs participent aux prises de décision 
à l'intérieur de commissions de surveillance et de conseils du travail. Les repré-
sentants ouvriers ont un droit de vote égal à celui des représentants de la direction 
pour la désignation du directeur du travail au conseil d'administration, C'est 
principalement dans les industries du charbon et de l'acier que la participation 
à la gestion a pris le plus d'ampleur en Allemagne de l'Ouest. Dans les industries 
du charbon et de l'acier, la commission de surveillance est formée de cinq repré-
sentants des employés, de cinq représentants des employeurs et d'un président 
neutre choisi à l'extérieur de la société. Dans quelques firmes, la commission de 
surveillance peut compter de quinze à vingt-et-un membres. La commission de 
surveillance ne se substitue pas à l'autorité des actionnaires. Sa fonction consiste 
à passer en revue toutes les activités commerciales et à surveiller les décisions du 
conseil d'administration. 
Dans les industries du charbon et de l'acier, le directeur ouvrier est élu aux 
conseils d'administration par le vote majoritaire des travailleurs et des représentants 
de la direction aux commissions de surveillance. On choisit généralement un ancien 
chef syndical, mais il doit nécessairement être acceptable aux deux parties. Les 
conseils d'administration comprennent aussi les directeurs technique et commercial, 
et quelques autres directeurs, tous désignés par les actionnaires. 
Les conseils du travail sont formés de représentants de toutes les catégories 
de travailleurs, qu'ils soient ou non membres d'un syndicat. Le conseil exerce pour 
partie une fonction de consultation, mais il s'occupe aussi de beaucoup des questions 
qui, ici au Canada, sont propres à l'activité syndicale, telles que les taux de salaires 
aux pièces et les primes, les heures de travail, les pauses ainsi que de l'hygiène 
professionnelle et de la sécurité. Sa fonction principale est de conseiller l'adminis-
tration sur la façon d'établir la collaboration entre le personnel et la direction et 
d'assurer la discipline. 
Tout jugement sur la cogestion doit tenir compte du contexte européen, Même 
s'il est puissant au niveau national, le mouvement syndical en Allemagne de l'Ouest 
est relativement faible au plan local. Il est trop tôt pour juger dans quelle mesure 
les syndicats et les conseils du travail peuvent coexister harmonieusement. Les 
travailleurs du rang considèrent principalement les conseils du travail et les com-
missions de surveillance comme des mécanismes utiles pour rehausser le statut et 
favoriser l'avancement des quelques travailleurs qui y sont élus ou nommés. Quant 
aux employeurs, ils ont reproché aux conseils de ne pas contribuer suffisamment 
à l'accroissement de l'efficacité de leurs entreprises. 
La participation des travailleurs aux décisions par l'entremise du système de 
négociation collective est le constat de la revendication historique des travailleurs 
dans leur volonté d'obtenir une autorité égale à celle des employeurs dans la déter-
mination des salaires et des conditions de travail. Elle confirme aussi la mutualité 
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des intérêts entre travailleurs et employeurs. Mais à rencontre de l'approche scien-
tifique de la « pseudo harmonie industrielle », elle met en relief l'état de conflit 
entre les travailleurs et les propriétaires concernant le partage des richesses produites 
grâce à leur effort commun. Contrairement à l'approche marxiste, la négociation 
collective ne cherche pas à remplacer la direction par des conseils ouvriers. Elle 
reconnaît à la direction une fonction spécialisée. L'harmonie industrielle est toujours 
quelque chose de contingent. Même si une espèce de guérilla et certains conflits 
armés prédominent quelquefois, les rapports collectifs du travail se déroulent en 
grande partie au jour le jour et d'année en année d'une façon ordonnée et pacifique. 
Le dynamisme de la négociation collective réside dans le conflit résultant de 
deux catégories de besoins, d'aspirations et d'insatisfactions qui s'opposent : ceux 
des travailleurs et ceux des employeurs. La négociation collective procure aux tra-
vailleurs l'occasion de participer à l'évolution sociale. Toute convention collective 
nouvelle, qui représente un accommodement entre ce que veulent les employeurs 
et ce que souhaitent les travailleurs, établit un ordre neuf et un ensemble de règles 
destinées à régir la façon de se comporter à l'usine . 
On n'y trouve nulle volonté bien enracinée d'exiger la participation aux 
conseils d'administration. L'idée en est préconisée par ceux qui substituent des 
formules toutes faites genre « tout le pouvoir au peuple» à l'examen systématique 
des méthodes capables de permettre aux travailleurs d'apporter des améliorations 
à leur milieu de travail, par ceux qui s'accrochent à un concept vaguement exprimé 
de « démocratie industrielle » en tant qu'un des instruments valables pour établir 
un nouvel ordre économique et social et, enfin, par ceux qui cherchent délibérément 
un système chimérique de représentation dans le but d'enfoncer un coin entre les 
travailleurs et les syndicats. 
De toutes les options possibles, la négociation collective offre aux ouvriers 
canadiens les meilleures occasions d'accroître le degré de leur participation à la 
direction. Les travailleurs canadiens rejettent la révolution comme moyen d'accroître 
le contrôle ouvrier. La cogestion est une idée emballante, mais elle reste un concept 
qui offre peu, si encore elle offre quelque chose, comme formule de participation 
des travailleurs à la direction. Les comités consultatifs patronaux-ouvriers traitent 
de questions sans véritable importance. Quant à la participation à la direction 
par le moyen de la démocratisation de l'industrie, elle a surtout consisté dans une 
tentative des employeurs en vue d'éviter la syndicalisation et elle n'a engagé les 
travailleurs qu'à un niveau purement consultatif. 
L'engagement des travailleurs dans la participation à la direction par le tru-
chement de la convention collective présuppose que les travailleurs continuent 
d'étendre le champ de la négociation à l'ensemble des sujets qui touchent aux gains, 
aux conditions de travail et à la sécurité de l'emploi. En même temps, le mouvement 
syndical devra accentuer ses efforts pour rejoindre les non-syndiqués et faire pres-
sion dans le sens d'une transformation économique et sociale portant sur un front 
plus vaste pour le bien de la collectivité dans son ensemble. 
